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"We know from recent experience that we are going to have to keep 
a new airplane in the inventory for a long time, since new airplane 
programs are increasingly infrequent. In order to delay the point 
during its life when it becomes obsolete, there is a tendency to push 
the state of the art to its limits. It has been estimated by experts 
in the industry that, when pushing the state of the art, the last two 
to five percent of performance doubles the cost." 
Major Frederick T. Stark, USAF, AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW, November-December 
1973. 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: The growing costs of military hardware and their causes are treated 
in this week's feature which appeared in the professional journal of the United States Air 
Force, the AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW, in November-December 1973. 
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FEATURE: WHY MILITARY AIRPLANES COST SO MUCH AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUTpf. ;;r.: 
- '~ ~ 
"The cost of growth of military hardware is increasingly the subject' of national debate. 
Critics of the Department of Defense cite massive cost overruns on major-:weapons programs, 
usually aircraft, as evidence of mismanagement and waste. Regardless otr,~Y lI!f}itary 
weapons costs have gone up, the result is that we are faced with buying ·~~rea~ngly 
expensive weapons with a defense budget that is actually declining in rJiation to the ' 
gross national product and total federal budget. r~ , 
It is important to understand how much military aircraft costs have risen when examin-
ing this subject. Obviously, one cannot compare the cost of a 50,000-pound F-111 to that 
of a 10,000-pound World War II fighter-bomber on any meaningful basis. The current air-
plane is larger and heavier, and for those reasons alone it should cost more. Also, the 
cost of factory labor during World War II was about one-fourth the cost of labor today. 
To get an accurate view of cost change, we should compare cost per pound in constant-value 
dollars based on factory labor pay rates. The cost per pound shall be based on empty 
Lweight, since this is a truer reflection of the materials and labor that went into the 
airplane. Cost per pound is also a good measure of the price of other manufactured products, 
such as automobiles, civil aircraft, and appliances. 
Therefore, instead of comparing the $60,000 cost of the World War II P-51 to the 
$7,500,000 cost of the new F-15, we should compare them on the basis of cost per pound in 
constant-value dollars. The comparison then becomes approximately $36 per pound for the 
P-51 to about $290 per pound for the F-15. Even these numbers are not precise, since there 
are other variables like production rate, amount of government-furnished equipment, labor 
productivity, extent of avionics, etc. Granted the imprecision of any set of cost numbers, 
the essential fact remains: aircraft cost growth is impressively large. We are currently 
paying eight times the cost per pound for fighter aircraft that we did in the 1940s. We 
are paying four or five times as much as we did in the 1950s and just under twice what we 
paid in the 1960s. These are production costs. Development costs have grown even more. 
The cost growth has some important but subtle effects that can be likened to a circle. 
As costs increase, we can afford to develop fewer new airplanes. This means that those we 
now have must stay in the inventory longer. When we eventually do have to buy a new air-
plane, it represents a greater technological change. This change is made by design teams 
that have had less opportunity to gain experience in developing airplanes since fewer air-
planes are being developed. The result is more development problems causing higher costs, 
and the circle continues. 
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Evidence that the circle effect exists can be seen in the reduced number of airplane 
types being developed, the increasing cost of airplanes (Figure 1), the increasing length 
of time aircraft remain operational (B-52, F-IOO, F-4, etc.), and the well-publicized 



































Figure 1. Cost per pound in 
1973 dollars for transport 
and fighter aircraft 
But costs for other things have increased in recent years, too, so perhaps military 
airplane cost growth is no greater than that of other products. Unfortunately, it is much 
greater. Automobiles have actually declined in cost per pound in constant-value dollars. 
Commercial transport aircraft costs have increased only one-sixth as much as fighter air-
craft, as indicated in Figure I. Some consumer items, such as appliances and electronic 
devices, have declined in unit cost in spite of inflation. 
The cost growth of military airplanes is most often attributed to the advanced tech-
nology required to produce them. Although advanced technology is a major factor in cost 
growth, it tends to be used as an only excuse for increases in cost. Overall, technology 
has driven costs down instead of up. This is reflected in our increased personal buying 
power, which is keeping ahead of inflation. Nearly every product is superior to its 
equivalent of ten years ago and requires fewer man-hours of work to purchase because tech-
nological advances are applied both to the products themselves and to the means of develop-
ing and producing them. We have every right to expect that a new airplane developed today 
will be superior in nearly every way to one produced a few years ago. It will be made on 
better machines, made of better materials, have better facilities to test is components, 
and have a lar~er base of scientific knowledge available to its designers. These factors 
should tend to drive the costs down. 
On the other hand we insist on additional capabilities or accessories that earlier air-
planes did not have, and they obviously affect cost. But there is another, less obvious 
factor that has an even greater impact. We know from recent experience that we are going 
to have to keep a new airplane in the inventory for a long time, since new airplane 
programs are increasingly infrequent. In order to delay the point during its life when it 
becomes obsolete, there is a tendency to push the state of the art to its limits. It has 
been estimated by experts in the industry that, when pushing the state of the art, the last 
two to five percent of performance doubles the cost. Not only does the cost go up but 
reliability tends to deteriorate, which raises total ownership cost. And such developments 
are often made by design groups that have little experience as a team because of the 
infrequency of development programs. This inexperience may lead to costly mistakes. Tech-
nology-or rather the application of technology too much toward end-item performance and no~ 
enough toward cost reduction-does have an important effect on cost increases. However, 
there are other important causes. 
When a manufacturer plans for production, he normally establishes facilities, machines, 
and tooling to produce at a given rate at the lowest possible cost. Often the government 
plans for this optimum rate but buys at a different rate. It seems that to increase the 
rate beyond the optimum has little adverse effect on unit cost. This is because the fixed 
overhead does not increase in proportion to production rate, thus offsetting the increased 
costs of factory overtime or of adding more shifts. However, when programs are in financial 
difficulty, production rates 'are often reduced in order to reduce the rate of spending. 
Invariably a sharp unit cost increase result~ since fixed overhead continues over a longer 
period of time. 
Changes in requirements normally have an adverse effect on costs, too. The seemingly 
simple addition of a cockpit instrument can cause a major rearrangement of the instrument 
panel, cooling ducts, eiectromagnetic interference protection, etc. Tests that were once 
completed may need to be rerun to verify the compatability of the new device with other 
installed equipment. Many of the financial difficulties of recent programs can be traced 
to government-imposed changes. There seems to be little sympathy from Congress or the 
public for this kind of cost increase. 
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The way we procure aircraft has evolved into a very complex, institutionalized process. 
It takes more than 500 government people in several commands to buy a major weapon system; 
there are hundreds of specifications that the contractor must comply with, and these people 
see to it that he does. They must know the status of the program every step of the way. 
They provide incremental approval for many of the contractor's actions. They impose man-
agement systems on the contractor, often more to improve their own visibility than to improve 
the efficiency of the contractor's operations. The result of this government involvement 
in the development process is that much of the contractor's effort is spent in satisfying 
government people. This takes the form of meetings, reports, briefings, movies, demon-
strations, tests, etc. While some of this is necessary, most of it does not contribute 
to the success of the final product. 
It is an unfortunate characterisitc of large bureaucracies that a great deal of effort 
is spent by some parts of the organization in answering investigations conducted by other 
1arts. For example, the TFX hearings conducted by the Senate required thousands of 
Department of Defense man-hours to support. The threat of other such hearings, or of 
General Accounting Office or Inspector General investigations, causes protective reactions 
on the part of government agencies directly responsible for development and procurement of 
weapon systems. Protective measures ultimately result in documents, many of which are 
prepared by the contractor. Consequently, when an investigative agency inquires into why 
costs are going up, that agency is itself one of the causes. 
In the last two or three years some important developments have been introduced to rever-
se the trends toward ever increasing costs by attacking their causes. The F-I5 program is 
on schedule and meeting its cost objectives. Increased authority was given to the System 
Program Director, and streamlined lines of authority were established to eliminate at least 
partially the need for "defensive" documentation. In addition, the competition for select-
ing the prime contractors stressed technical and management approaches above other consider-
ations, insuring that the most capable contractor would be chosen. At the subsystem level 
there were important hardware competitions before selecting subcontractors. Lastly, the 
method of contracting provides the contractor with profit incentives for keeping costs 
down rather than rewarding him for cost increases, as often occurred under the old "cost 
plus fixed fee" contracts. 
The F-I5 in all probability will not suffer cost overruns that have characterized re-
cent airplane programs such as the C-5, F-III, and F-I4. This is a significant accomplish-
ment. However, the F-I5 is still going to be an expensive airplane. To attempt to reverse 
the trend to even higher costs, the Air Force has embraced the "prototyping" concept 
advocated by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard. The A-X lightweight 
fighter, and the STOL transport programs are being conducted under the prototyping concept. 
Actually, this concept is not new but a return to the time prior to the 1960s when air-
planes rather than paper proposals competed for production contracts. In the case of the 
A-X, two prototypes competed in a fly-off. The winning A-IO was selected on the basis of 
actual performance comparison with the A-9. The A-IO has now entered into a full-scale 
development program aimed at production. The costs of the A-X development program 
will be under $400 million, compared to the nearly one billion dollars it takes under 
conventional procedures to develop one airplane. The cost is substantially lower since 
the technical risks have been reduced by the fly-off. To date, prototyping is successful. 
The A-9 and A-IO in the A-X program have performed excellently, and the very low level of 
funding has forced the contractors to consider costs as important as any hardware perfor-
mance goal. 
"Design to cost" is now evolving as a philosophy that is shaping programs of all the 
services. Simply stated, "Cost is a design goal just like reliability, weight or per-
formance." Where trade-offs are required, cost is one of the key considerations. For 
example, if a part can be made for one-half the cost at a weight increase of ten percent, 
serious consideration will be given to accepting the weight increase. 
Hopefully, these are steps in a new direction toward lower-cost weapons, not merely a 
pause during the cl~b toward ever increasing costs. It is interesting that the government 
and weapons industry appear to be rediscovering what the civilian sector of our economy has 
known all along; i.e., competition and the resulting cost control are necessary for success. 
Perhaps we can further approach the characteristics of free enterprise in the civilian market 
and thus begin to approach the absolutely outstanding success it has had in providing more 
and better goods for less relative cost. 
Some of the characteristics of civilian product developments are as follows: 
a. With high technology 
what the customer wants and needs. 
develops his product. 
products, the producer more than the customer determines 
Based on his perception of customer wants and needs, he 
b. Products are usually evolutionary in nature. They are ordinarily developed by 
a design team that is experienced with the product type and in working together as a team. 
c. The producer recognizes that if his costs are not kept as low as possible he 
will lose sales and profit. 
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d. The producer in unencumbered by customer requirements in determining how he 
will design and build his product. 
e. His "reward" for failing to meet the customer's need is loss of sales, which, 
if continued, results in failure of the business. 
The above are some characteristics of a free enterprise, free market system. No system 
yet devised has matched its performance. In recent years it has been widely accepted that 
military weapon systems cannot possible be procured in a free market way. The most obvious 
reason is that there is a single customer, the government, and this customer is very 
unpredictable in his needs and desire to buy. In addition, the cost of development of a 
weapon system is prohibitive for private risk capital. 
If the risk of dollar loss from developing weapon systems that are not purchased is 
removed, it is likely that many companies would welcome the chance to compete in a more 
or less free market atmosphere. It is possible to devise a way to do this and spend no 
more, and perhaps less, than we now spend. 
In all likelihood there is going to be a continuing need for airplanes, ships, tanks, 
guns, and vehicles. These items, like most serially produced, manufactured items, benefit 
enormously from evolutionary development. Let's take fighter airplanes as an example of 
how free market characteristics might be introduced into development and procurement. 
Suppose five aircraft companies were competitively selected and each was provided with $50 
million annually to develop prototype fighters. Each company would be required to provide 
the Air Force with two prototypes of a design for evaluation every two years. This is very 
generous funding in light of the YF-16 and YF-17 prototype programs, each of which has a 
prime contract cost of under $50 million for two prototypes. The determination of what 
makes a good fighter would be left primarily to the contractors. If they guessed wrong 
about Air Force needs, they would not get a production contract. 
The prototypes would be in competition with each other and with aircraft already in the 
inventory. It would be the responsibility and desire of a contractor to prove that buying 
his airplane was more cost effective than keeping existing inventory aircraft or purchasing 
aircraft from his competitors. Failure to sell a new airplane would not result in 
financial disaster, and the unsuccessful design teams could remain intact, correct their 
weaknesses, and try to develop a more salable prototype. 
The advantages to the Air Force would be substantial. At anyone time there would be 
an inventory of prototypes of differing capabilities from which to choose. Should operation-
al needs change, there would be a strong probability that one of the prototypes would come 
close to meeting the new need, since the contractor's perception of what the Air Force 
needs may be better than our own. (There are such examples in other high technology 
markets.) The contractors, if left relatively free from detailed specifications, would be 
more able to innovate. The successful innovations would be of great benefit to the Air 
Force while unsuccessful innovations would not cause cost and schedule problems experienced 
on recent programs. 
But most important, we would develop a national resource, teams of designers with 
experience in developing actual flying military aircraft, as opposed to the current 
temporary teams characterized by massive hiring and layoffs depending upon the winning or 
losing of contracts. 
David Packard stated recently to industry representatives, "I am convinced, after 
spending three years in the Pentagon, that the (aerospace) industry is grossly overstaffed 
and very inefficient by any sound management standards." He went on to say, "I cannot in 
fairness place all the blame on the industry, for in many cases you have simply responded 
to what was asked for by some of the so-called 'experts' in the Pentagon." 
In the past couple of years some management innovations have been instituted in an 
attempt to slow or reverse the trend toward ever increasing costs. Hopefully, they will 
work, but they have a certain familiar "ring" to them reminiscent of cure-all systems of 
the recent past-concurrency, disengagement, Total Package Procurement, PERT. However, 
there is one important difference: competition of hardware. Only time will tell whether 
this is a step toward the efficiency of a more competitive, free market way of buying 
weapons or a timid hesitation in the march deeper into the bureaucratic mire that 
characterizes our present weapons acquisition process. If it is only a hestiation, the 
day may not be far off when Calvin Coolidge's question, "Why not just buy one airplane and 
let the aviators take turns?" will be applicable." (Major Frederick T. Stark, USAF, AIR 
UNIVERSITY REVIEW, November-December 1973) 
